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Abstract
Describes the importance of Brazil in the FTAA, the reasons for its interest, and the role that
it will play in shaping the organization’s future.
THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE
AMERICAS AND BRAZIL
Ambassador Rubens Antonio Barbosa*
The origin of the Free Trade Area of the Americas
("FTAA") project can be traced back to the Initiative of the
Americas, launched by President George Bush in June 1990.' In-
itially, the FTAA was no more than a statement of intent that
would later turn into an ambitious project of hemispheric inte-
gration at the Summit of the Americas ("the Summit"), held in
Miami, Florida on December 10, 1994.2 At the Summit, the
heads of government of the Americas agreed to conclude their
negotiations of the FTAA by no later than 2005 and also decided
upon the topics to be negotiated, including market access for
both agricultural and manufactured goods, services, government
procurement, intellectual property, investment, dispute resolu-
tion, trade remedies (i.e., antidumping, and countervailing du-
ties) and competition policy (e.g., antitrust).
Brazil has played an active and constructive role since the
beginning of the negotiating process and has repeatedly reiter-
ated its will to conclude a successful agreement by 2005. 3 Bra-
zil's active participation in the negotiations has been primarily
due to the significance of its hemispheric market, which is the
destination for more than 55% of Brazil's total exports, nearly
80% of which are manufactured products.4 For Brazil, the FTAA
signifies not only obtaining access to the U.S. market, but also
the prospect of exporting to other countries in the hemisphere
with which Brazil does not yet have free trade agreements.
Brazil's goals in the FTAA negotiations are well known. Bra-
zil seeks improved access to the markets of the hemisphere for
* Ambassador of Brazil to the United States of America.
1. See Rubens Antonio Barbosa, FFAA and the Future of Regional Integration: The
Brazilian View, at http://www.brasilemb.org/trade-investment/tradeembaixador-ftaa.
shtml; Terry McCoy, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Opportunities and Challenges for
Florida, at http://www.latam.ufl.edu/publications/ftaa-paper.html.
2. First Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles, Miami, Florida, Dec.
11, 1994, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 808 (1995).
3. See Barbosa, supra note 1; Raul Gouvea & Jana Hranaiova, Brazil and the FIAA:
Strategic Trade Options, 10(2) MULTINATIONAL Bus. REV. (Fall 2002).
4. Source of statistical data: Trade Promotion Section of the Brazilian Embassy to
the U.S.
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its main export products, which would necessarily involve negoti-
ating a series of commitments, including: (a) the elimination of
both tariff and non-tariff barriers; (b) stronger disciplines on the
use of agricultural subsidies and food assistance programs; (c)
greater transparency in applying trade remedy rules, particularly
in antidumping, and countervailing duties and safeguards; and
(d) balanced results in the negotiation of other commitments
that would be included in the future FTAA Agreement. Brazil
has consistently advocated throughout the FIAA negotiations
the defense of its national interest based on the following prin-
ciples: pragmatism, balanced results, inclusion of all the prod-
ucts in the negotiation, compatibility with WTO rules, and co-
existence with the existing sub-regional agreements.
A NEW ADMINISTRATION IN BRAZIL
President Luiz Inicio Lula da Silva, in his inaugural speech,
reiterated how important trade negotiations are for Brazil as a
means of fully integrating Brazil into the most dynamic flows of
international trade and investment, while respecting its right to
make decisions regarding its development model.5 In that spirit,
the Lula administration made a commitment to remain engaged
in the different negotiating processes entered into by the pre-
ceding administration, whether multilateral, regional, or bilat-
eral in scope. These negotiations involve the WTO, FIAA, MER-
COSUR-EU, MERCOSUR-Andean Community, MERCOSUR-
Mexico, MERCOSUR-India, and MERCOSUR-South Africa.6
With regard to the FTAA, the new administration renewed the
Brazilian commitment to continue its active participation in the
hemispheric negotiations, which entered its decisive stage begin-
5. President Luiz Indcio Lula da Silva, A New Course for Brazil, Address to the
Congress by the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil (Jan. 1, 2003) available at
http://www.mre.gov.br/ingles/politica-externa/discursos/index.asp. The President
stated:
Through our foreign trade ... Brazil's foreign relations will aim at improving
the living conditions of Brazilian men and women, at increasing income levels
and generating dignified jobs. Trade negotiations are today of vital impor-
tance. With respect to the FTAA ... Brazil ill... attempt to obtain fairer and
more appropriate conditions for fostering the Nation's development.
Id.
6. Id. See, e.g., Juan Blanco Prada, Da Silva's One-Year Mark: Realism, Fiscal Responsi-
bility, MiAmi HERALD, Jan. 16, 2004; Juan Forero, Brazil Pushes for South American Trade
Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003 (stating "the Andean Community of Nations have
agreed to conclude free trade talks with MERCOSUR").
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ning with the Quito Ministerial Meeting in November 2002,
when Brazil and the United States assumed their roles as co-
chairs of the negotiating process.
However, in mid-2002, the U.S. government changed its ne-
gotiating strategy in two critical areas. First, on the issue of mar-
ket access, the U.S. proposed making bilateral offers to countries
or groups of countries instead of offering concessions based on
most favored nation ("MFN") principle. Second, with regard to
the rules governing trade remedies, agricultural domestic sup-
port and export subsidies, the United States began to defend the
argument that these topics should be dealt with multilaterally,
despite the fact that the FTAA negotiating mandate envisaged
hemispheric disciplines to be applied to these issues in the fu-
ture FTAA.
Brazil faced growing U.S. resistance to negotiating within
the FTAA process topics that had been included in the original
FTAA negotiating mandate, including domestic agricultural sup-
ports and trade remedies. Based on the argument that these is-
sues were systemic in nature, the new Brazilian government be-
lieved that U.S. non-compliance with the original FTAA mandate
had created an imbalance in the negotiating process that
needed to be corrected.
This imbalance became even more accentuated when WTO-
plus negotiating proposals were advanced on topics such as intel-
lectual property, government procurement, services and invest-
ment that went far beyond trade-related aspects, and even in-
cluded disciplines that would directly affect the regulatory au-
tonomy of the countries involved in the negotiations. The
assessment made by the new Brazilian government was that this
type of focus had the potential to undermine Brazil's capacity to
design and carry out social, environmental, and technological
development policies. Moreover, if adopted, such focus would
not result in any valuable tradeoff in other areas of special inter-
est to Brazil.
Beyond these imbalances, the negotiating process has en-
dured other tensions. Some of these have been associated with
the challenge of promoting integration among a large number
of countries with a sharp degree of economic disparities and dif-
ferent levels of ambition vis-A-vis the scope of the future FTAA.
In fact, no other trade integration process has ever been
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launched on the basis of such a heterogeneous set of countries
as the FTAA negotiations.
Other tensions in the negotiating process arise from certain
countries' insistence on expanding the negotiating agenda,
which is already extremely complex, to include labor and envi-
ronmental issues that were not part of the original IFTAA negoti-
ating mandate. Aside from the lack of a hemispheric mandate,
hemispheric disciplines to regulate these issues which are
equally systemic in nature, would potentially cause the diversion
of trade and investment flows to the benefit of countries that do
not have to bear additional costs on labor and environmental
issues.
Faced with this situation of imbalances, and after considera-
ble thought, both within the government and with entities of
civil society, the government of President Lula approved the key
aspects of the Brazilian position in the hemispheric negotiations
(the "Brazilian Proposal").' The Brazilian Proposal, which to a
large extent incorporated the new U.S. position, may be suc-
cinctly described as follows: (a) the topics of market access for
goods and, to a lesser extent, for services and investment, would
be addressed in a 4+1 negotiating mode between MERCOSUR
and the U.S.; (b) the hemispheric negotiation process itself
would focus on basic elements, such as rules of origin, dispute
resolution, special and differential treatment for developing
countries, compensation funds, phytosanitary rules, and busi-
ness-facilitating measures; and (c) systemic topics, such as intel-
lectual property, certain aspects of the investment chapter, for
which disciplines within the FTAA would create free-ride effects
(e.g., for trade partners outside the hemisphere), would be
transferred to the WTO, as advocated by the United States for
the topics it considers most sensitive, such as domestic support
and trade remedies.
This Brazilian proposal was not only a response to the cur-
rent imbalances in the FTAA negotiations, but also a call for
pragmatism. Its great merit is its recognition that not only
MERCOSUR, but also other trade partners in the hemisphere
have significant domestic sensitivities in certain negotiating ar-
eas, which must be taken into consideration in designing the ar-
7. See MERCOSUR, US 4 + 1 Talks, MERCO PRESS, (May 12, 2003), available at http:/
/www.mercopress.com/Detalle.asp?NUM=2156.
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chitecture of the future FTAA. In other words, Brazil's goal is to
have new rules about topics that are highly sensitive to the nego-
tiating parties discussed either at the multilateral level or among
those countries that wish to discuss them, but not at the hemi-
spheric level, given that countries such as the United States, Ca-
nada, and Brazil have already illustrated the difficulties in estab-
lishing hemispheric rules in certain areas of negotiation. The
virtue of the Brazilian proposal is that it takes into account the
realities of the positions expressed by the countries and trans-
lates them into an architecture for negotiation that takes into
consideration the sensitivities and asymmetries that exist among
the countries participating in the hemispheric negotiation.
This is what gave rise to the idea of a feasible FTAA, as op-
posed to a "maximalist" FTAA that is simply unrealistic, given the
changes that have taken place in the region in the last ten years."
The Brazilian proposal is aligned with the position advocated by
the United States, under which the topics of agricultural subsi-
dies and antidumping measures can only be negotiated in the
WTO. Applying the same logic used by the United States, Brazil
understands that the negotiation of new rules for services, invest-
ment, intellectual property and government procurement must
also be left to the multilateral negotiations.
The Brazilian position is not merely a tactical reaction to
the U.S. negotiating strategy regarding the so-called systemic is-
sues. In fact, Brazil has a clear interest in preventing hemi-
spheric disciplines on topics such as investment, intellectual
property, government procurement, and services from curtailing
its ability to formulate and implement public policies that are in
its highest national interest.
The fact is that the legacy of the Uruguay Round was a
harsh lesson for Brazil, proving that the negotiation of addi-
tional multilateral disciplines in areas that are central for Brazil's
technological, scientific, and social development should be pre-
ceded by impact studies, so as to avoid any possible constraints
on Brazil's freedom of action. This was the case, for example,
regarding the policy on patents and public health, affected by
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
8. See Gary C. Hufbauer & Barbara Kotschwar, The Future of Regional Trading Ar-
rangements in the Western Hemisphere, at http://www.sice.oas.org/geograph/papers/iie/
hufbauer0998.asp.
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("TRIPs") agreement, and the policy on incentives and matching
contributions for the installation of foreign companies in Brazil,
affected by the Trade Related Investment Measures agreement
The proposals currently being considered as possible hemi-
spheric disciplines in areas such as services, investment, intellec-
tual property, and government procurement may constitute con-
straints on Brazil's future development options, which is why
Brazil is not currently interested in making any commitments re-
garding them.
The rules on investment provide the clearest example of be-
ing contrary to Brazil's future development. Reflecting the con-
cerns that led to the debacle of the negotiations for a Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment ("MAI"), 9 the Brazilian Congress
has indicated on several occasions that it has no interest in ap-
proving investment agreements that may contravene Brazil's fun-
damental constitutional principles and essential interests, which
have not prevented foreign investors from investing in Brazil or
having their interests protected by contracts and the due process
of law.
In addition to the pragmatic approach of taking into ac-
count national sensitivities regarding specific topics, the Brazil-
ian Proposal endorses another important mode of negotiation
that is already being used in the FTAA negotiating process -
the bilateral negotiation (or 4+1, in the case of MERCOSUR) to
exchange market access offers.
When presenting its initial offers, the United States decided
to distinguish among groups of countries that would receive dif-
ferent offers, with MERCOSUR having received the least
favorable offer in terms of tariff reductions in order to gain ac-
cess to the U.S. market.
The MERCOSUR proposal establishes that other countries
or groups of countries may have the same opportunity to differ-
entiate between what they can offer to this or that trade partner
in the FTAA negotiations. In other words, the negotiating meth-
odology proposed by Brazil and its MERCOSUR partners is not
at all different from that presented by the United States. Just as
the U.S. negotiators distinguished between the poorest countries
in the Caribbean and the countries of MERCOSUR, Brazil be-
9. OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Apr. 24, 1998), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/40/1895712.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
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lieves it is also fair for MERCOSUR to offer more favorable tariff
reduction schedules to countries such as Ecuador and Vene-
zuela, for example, because Brazil is less sensitive to these two
countries' export capabilities.
Therefore, the main aspects of MERCOSUR's negotiating
proposal are, on the one hand, to transfer to the WTO, or to the
venue of a smaller group of countries, those topics that are
clearly sensitive for the countries negotiating the FTAA and, on
the other hand, to negotiate market access concessions on a bi-
lateral basis.
This is a constructive proposal that neither restricts nor im-
poses prior commitments, since it also allows desiring countries
to further discuss hemispheric disciplines, without the need for
other countries to accept those disciplines agreed under bilat-
eral or "plurilateral" agreements. In addition to favoring bal-
anced and attainable results by 2005, this proposal has the addi-
tional advantage of accommodating different degrees of ambi-
tion regarding the future FTAA over the short, medium, and
long term.
Showing again its willingness to negotiate and to find a com-
promise to allow the process to advance in the Ministerial Meet-
ing in Miami (November, 2003), Brazil agreed to adjust its pro-
posal and negotiate all issues within the FTAA, provided that the
systemic components of certain issues were left to the WTO.
THE CURRENT US. ADMINISTRATION
The current economic and political situation in the United
States is not conducive to the negotiation of a balanced FTAA.
On the one hand, there are U.S. economic sectors with aggres-
sive interests such as services, finance, investment, cutting-edge
technology industries, and intellectual property, which have
been pressuring for a maximalist FTAA. On the other hand, the
increasing strength of the protectionist lobbies (representing ec-
onomic sectors such as agriculture, textiles, steel, unions, and
environmental non-government organizations ("NGOs")) limits
the possibility of achieving the necessary tradeoffs necessary to
advance the hemispheric negotiations. The slowdown in the
U.S. economy in 2001-2003 and the concerns with unemploy-
ment have only aggravated this trend.
Despite its free-trade rhetoric, the protectionist bias in U.S.
1024 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:1017
trade policy, which aside from China also views Brazil as a favor-
ite target for trade remedies promoted by U.S. lobbies, is likely
to worsen during the 2004 presidential election campaign. Ad-
ding to the difficulties imposed by the politicized climate of the
U.S. presidential campaign are the restrictive terms of the Trade
Promotion Authority and the trade-distorting agricultural subsi-
dies established in the new Farm Bill. 10 Together, these two laws
serve as a straitjacket, limiting the U.S. government's ability to
make concessions, especially regarding topics of interest to Bra-
zil, such as agricultural subsidies, tariff peaks, and trade reme-
dies. This statutory rigidity, combined with the competitive lib-
eralization strategy adopted by the United States Trade Repre-
sentative of launching parallel free trade agreement negotiations
with the countries in the hemisphere, have created additional
tensions for the FTAA negotiating process. Although initiatives
aimed at providing better market access conditions within the
region should be fully supported, there is a potential risk of dis-
sipating the negotiating efforts to complete the FTAA, once our
partners have achieved their main trade goals through other ne-
gotiating fora.
From the perspective of the United States, what is attractive
about simultaneous negotiations is not their potential for creat-
ing significant volumes of U.S. exports, given the small size of
the markets of the countries that are now candidates to become
favored U.S. trading partners. Rather, the U.S. interest in nego-
tiating these bilateral agreements seems to lie primarily in their
potential for creating negotiating precedents for the future
FTAA, in terms of both "offensive" and "defensive" topics, and in
shattering potential coalitions with positions that are at odds
with U.S. negotiating ambitions.
POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING SCENARIOS AFTER THE FTAA
MINISTERIAL MEETING IN MIAMI
The FTAA Ministerial Meeting in Miami offered a unique
opportunity for the thirty-four countries present to re-examine
the overall architecture of the FTAA negotiations. It allowed
them to establish principles whereby each country may assume
10. See Congressional Research Service, Trade Promotion (Fast-Track) Authority: Sum-
mary & Analysis of Selected Major Provisions of H.R 3005 (Apr. 15, 2002), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/10090.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
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differentiated commitments, in accordance with their level of
ambition on a specific topic, taking into account their respective
national sensitivities, as a way to enable the negotiations to con-
clude no later than January 2005.
From a political perspective, the most significant section of
the Ministerial Declaration was "the Vision of the FTAA," in
which the countries in the hemisphere reaffirmed their commit-
ment to a negotiating process leading to a comprehensive and
balanced FTAA.
The Miami Ministerial Meeting also served to reiterate the
established principle that had already been recognized in other
Ministerial Declarations - taking into account the different
levels of development and sizes of economies in each area of
negotiation, as well as devoting special attention to the smallest
economies when establishing horizontal disciplines. In this con-
text, recommendations were made about financing methods and
mechanisms to address the need for adjustments as a result of
the different levels of development and sizes of economies.
These recommendations will allow the discussions to advance to-
wards establishing a compensation fund within the scope of the
FTAA.
The FTAA Trade Negotiations Committee was instructed to
develop a balanced and common set of rights and obligations,
which would be applicable to all countries. The negotiations re-
garding the common set of rights and obligations will include
provisions in the areas of market access, agriculture, services, in-
vestment, government procurement, intellectual property, com-
petition policies, subsidies, antidumping, and countervailing du-
ties.
Countries are free to negotiate additional disciplines or lib-
eralizations "plurilaterally," with a small group of countries,
rather than multilaterally, with all the other thirty-four FTAA
countries. Those countries that do not wish to actively engage in
these plurilateral negotiations may participate in the negotia-
tion groups as observers and may later endorse the conclusions
reached in these negotiations.
Despite the positive discussions in Miami on market access
negotiations, which are expected to be concluded by September
30, 2004, Brazil does not rule out the realistic possibility that, as
a result of these negotiations, a significant proportion of Brazil-
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ian export products may be included in the U.S. list of "sensitive
products." In practice, this would mean excluding free trade
from the hemisphere during a transitional period that could last
much more than ten years. Some sensitive products in the US-
Australia FTA recently negotiated will only be liberalized in eigh-
teen years.
A negotiating scenario less detrimental to Brazil would in-
volve the possibility of negotiating concessions that, even if they
fail to liberalize trade in the short term, would at least ensure a
gradual opening of regional markets to Brazilian exports with an
MFN provision. In an even more optimistic scenario, the future
F[AA would include commitments to gradually eliminate all
tariff and non-tariff barriers imposed on important Brazilian ex-
port products, primarily in agribusiness and the steel industry. It
also would incorporate clearer disciplines, not only in the area
of trade remedies, but also in agricultural subsidies (domestic
support for production and export subsidies), thus creating con-
ditions for fair market competition for Brazilian exports in the
markets of the hemisphere.
From the U.S. perspective, it is possible to envision two ne-
gotiating scenarios. In the first, and more optimistic, scenario,
the U.S. government would accept the political cost of con-
fronting protectionist lobbies and would moderate its aggressive
agenda. In the second, and more probable, scenario, the cur-
rent U.S. administration would, on the one hand, find it impossi-
ble to make concessions in its "defensive" agenda, and, on the
other hand, would maintain its maximalist approach with a view
to implementing its aggressive agenda. It also would push the
option of pursuing bilateral free trade agreements to their limits,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the Latin American
countries, due to their current political and economic situations,
as well as the fact that most countries in the region are depen-
dent on some preferential trade agreement with the United
States (such as the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, or
the Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act)."
These scenarios take into account not only the difficulties
11. Some sensitive products in the US-Australia FTA recently negotiated will be
only liberalized in eighteen years.
See Office of the United States Trade Representative, First Report to the Congress on the
Operation of the Andean Trade Preference Act As Amended (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http:/
/www.ustr.gov/reports/2003atpa.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
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that currently exist at the negotiation table, but also the specific
domestic situations of the countries in the hemisphere, begin-
ning with the U.S. electoral schedule and the prevailing anti-free
trade mood in the U.S. Congress, which raises even greater
doubts about the capacity of one of the major trading partners
in the negotiation to make effective concessions on access to its
market.
It is with good reason that Brazil, as one of the co-chairs of
the hemispheric negotiating process, has been calling for both
realism and pragmatism in the negotiations, in order to con-
clude the negotiations by earlyJanuary 2005, as well as to achieve
its goal of an FTAA that is both balanced and satisfactory to all of
the thirty-four countries.
Despite the accomplishments achieved in Miami, which
have made it possible to conclude negotiations by the agreed
deadline, there are still many political and technical difficulties
to overcome, both in establishing rules and disciplines and in
reaching a satisfactory package on market access. It will be diffi-
cult to accept, for instance, a cross-sectoral balance of rights and
obligations, in which countries that do not participate in the
WTO-plus negotiations of certain rules would be penalized in
the area of market access, as was mentioned during the meeting
in Miami.
The Miami decisions have faced a first test in Puebla, Mex-
ico in February 2005 and will be tested again when the Trade
Negotiating Committee (TNC) resumes talks next March.
Brazil continues to be cautiously optimistic that the coun-
tries can agree on a common framework when the TNC re-
sumes. If the TNC is able to reach an agreement in the next
meeting, prospects for completing the FTAA on time will be
good. But if there are still difficulties to arrive at a consensus on
balanced and common set of rights and obligations, it could
start to be worrying, since September 2004 is the deadline for
completing market access negotiations, as set out by the hemi-
sphere's trade ministers last November in Miami.
It is important to point out that the prevailing mood in
Washington, especially in Congress, in an electoral year is not
favorable to free trade agreements. The recently concluded U.S.
trade agreements with Central America and Australia, in which
the United States either refused to place sensitive sectors on the
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table - like sugar in the Australia FTA - or insisted on lengthy
transition periods before tariffs end is a good example of that
mood.
The United States and the G-14 member countries are look-
ing for similar exemptions for their sensitive products in the
FTAA. Canada, for example, proposed keeping ninety-seven of
its products completely off the negotiating table in its market
access offer. While the G-14 is offering less-than-total market ac-
cess in goods, especially in agriculture, it wants countries to
agree to WTO-plus rules in areas like services, investment, intel-
lectual property and government procurement. And at the same
time, the United States continues to insist that farm supports
and trade remedy laws cannot be negotiated in the FTAA. This
is not a balanced proposal for Brazil and MERCOSUR.
